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Rethinking Civil RICO: The Vexing
Problem of Causation in Fraud-Based
Claims Under 18 U.S.C § 1962(c)
By RANDY D. GoRnON*
SINCE THE Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") statute was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970,1 academics and judges have spilled a sea of ink in the
service of competing attempts to curb or expand its reach. Commen-
tators have oscillated between widely separated poles, with one camp
condemning RICO as "very possibly the single worst piece of legisla-
tion on the books"2 or "the civil law's Moby Dick"3 and the other laud-
ing the statute as "the preferred remedy for victims of large-scale
frauds."4 Judges have found themselves variously ascribing to both po-
sitions, depending on the legal context; they often "enthusiastically
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1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
2. Editorial, Second Thoughts on RICO, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at A14; see also Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom, WALL ST.J., May 19, 1989, at A14.
3. Lee Applebaum, Is There a Good Faith Claim for the RICO Enterprise Plaintiff., 27 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 519, 522 n.16 (2002) (observing that "[f]or those trying to understand RICO's
history, nature, scope, and proper application, the statute can push the limits of compre-
hension"). The Melvillian allusion is to the memorable line "what the White Whale was to
them, or how to their unconscious understandings.., he might have seemed the gliding
great demon of the seas of life,-all this to explain, would be to dive deeper than Ishmael
can go." HERMAN MELVILLE, MoBY-DICK OR, THE WHALE 184 (Hendricks House, Inc. 1952)
(1851).
4. Michael Goldsmith & Evan S. Tilton, Proximate Cause in Civil Racketeering Cases: The
Misplaced Role of Victim Reliance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 98 (2002).
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embrace [ ]" criminal RICO, while viewing civil RICO as "an anti-mafia
law run amuck."5
It is with respect to this latter point that critical ink has flowed
most freely. All sides would probably agree that the debate over how,
where, and whether to delimit RICO's civil component admits of no
easy solution and that the situation is worsened by the vague and com-
plicated statutory text. While RICO was plainly designed to combat
organized crime, 6 the underlying problem is that its language may be
read to apply as easily to the conduct of bankers and accountants as to
wiseguys and goodfellas. Thus, the question is, Where does one draw
the line between conduct that the statute will and will not reach?
This Article does not try to mediate every dispute over the appli-
cability of civil RICO. Its goal is rather more modest-namely, to de-
scribe what limits the civil remedy provision of the RICO statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c), places on fraud-based RICO claims. To do so, the
Article revisits major Supreme Court milestones and considers
whether, as many alarmists have recently declaimed, the lower courts
generally disregard these milestones.
One way to approach these issues is to examine the requirement
in § 1964(c) that any civil RICO claim be predicated on a demonstra-
tion that a substantive RICO violation caused the plaintiffs alleged in-
juries. This statutory mandate to prove a causal link between act and
injury is particularly important in class actions, because causation is
difficult to prove on a class-wide basis where misrepresentations form
the basis of the complained-of conduct. Historically, courts have
agreed that fraud cases are presumptively noncertifiable when reli-
ance is an element that must be pled and proven. Courts have there-
fore struggled to determine how or whether that presumption should
bear on a fraud-based RICO class action claim. Countless disputes
have erupted over the applicability and meaning of the reliance and
causation nomenclature within the RICO context. This Article con-
cludes that these disputes are too often staged at too high a level of
abstraction, and they thus divert attention from the facts of individual
cases.
To arrive at this conclusion, this Article explores a number of
issues related to the causation element in civil RICO cases. Part I ex-
amines RICO's purpose and explains the structure of a RICO-fraud
5. Id. at 92-93.
6. 84 Stat. at 923 ("It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States."); see also Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 496 (2000) (discussing
the purpose of RICO).
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claim. Part II introduces the standard for causation in a RICO context
and discusses the questions left open by that standard. Part III looks
closely at the element of causation in fraud-based RICO class actions
to demonstrate why courts should make fact-specific inquires, rather
than apply broad generalizations to causation.
I. Civil RICO Overview
A. The Purpose and Development of Civil RICO Claims
As courts to this day often stress, RICO finds its genesis in a gov-
ernmental desire to obliterate organized crime. 7 The immediate
source of RICO, Senate Bill 1861,8 was "designed to 'prohibit the infil-
tration or management of legitimate organizations' by means of racke-
teering activity as well as investment of the proceeds of racketeering
activity in such organizations." 9 Late in the process, the House added
a section providing for a private, treble damages right of action, which
was modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act.10 Criminal syndicate
activity was also the aim of this section. Representative Sam Steiger,
Arizona, urged that "those who have been wronged by organized
crime should at least be given access to a legal remedy."'1 The House
Committee brushed aside the concerns of three of its members who
feared the treble damages provision would "provide[ ] invitation for
disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent
businessmen."12
Against this backdrop, courts initially looked askance at civil
RICO claims that could not be expressly linked to organized criminal
activity. Several methods to limit RICO claims emerged: some courts
held that civil RICO could be invoked only against organized crime; 13
7. See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
8. S. Res. 1861, 91st Cong., 115 CONG. REc. 9512 (1969).
9. DAVID B. SMITH & TERRENCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO 1.01, at 1-4 (2004).
10. See Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 15). Organized Crime Control: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 543-44, 548, 559 (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings]; 116 CONG.
REc. 25,190-91 (1970).
11. House Hearings, supra note 10, at 520 (statement of Rep. Steiger).
12. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 187 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4083
(dissenting views of Reps. John Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and William F. Ryan).
13. See, e.g., Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that
"[i] t is clear that [RICO] was aimed not at legitimate business organizations but at combat-
ing 'a society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the control of the American
people and their governments[,]" and concluding that because "[t]here is no question
that defendant cannot be so characterized .... we find plaintiffs proposed ... claim for
relief specious, frivolous and without merit" (citations omitted)).
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others mandated proof of "competitive injury" as an element of stand-
ing; 14 and yet others required a showing of "racketeering injury"
caused by acts resulting in a "criminal conviction."' 5
The Supreme Court, however, swept these obstacles away in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.' 6 In Sedima the Court held that "[i]f
the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a man-
ner forbidden by [the RICO statute], and the racketeering activities
injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a
claim.' 7 In the wake of this broad holding, the battleground shifted
to the requirement that injury to business or property be caused "by
reason of' a violation of one of the four enumerated subparts of
§ 1962.18
This limitation on the statute's application remains today. 19 The
debate surrounding the "by reason of' element most often arises in
cases of fraud-based RICO claims. These claims are alluring because
14. See, e.g., N. Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
15. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494-503 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 479 (1985).
16. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
17. Id. at 495.
18. RICO § 1964 provides for civil remedies. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000). Section 1962
sets forth the four RICO offenses: three of which are substantive and one of which sounds
in conspiracy. Id. § 1962. In essence, § 1962(a) was designed to prevent racketeers from
using illicit money to purchase or operate legitimate businesses, § 1962(b) was designed to
prohibit the takeover of legitimate businesses through racketeering acts (e.g., muscling in
on a business through extortion or loan sharking), and § 1962(c) was intended to prevent
the operation of a legitimate business through racketeering. See SMITH & REED, supra note
9, 5.01, at 5-2. Only rarely is a plaintiff able to sustain a claim under the first two subsec-
tions. This is so because § 1962(a) requires pleading and proof of an "investment injury"
and § 1962(b) requires pleading and proof of an "acquisition or maintenance injury":
Under subsections (a) and (b), there must be a nexus between the claimed RICO
violations and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. For subsection (a), this means
that the injury must flow from the investment of racketeering income into the
enterprise.... As to subsection (b), a plaintiff must show that his injuries were
proximately caused by a RICO person gaining an interest in, or control of, the
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Because § 1962(c) is
the RICO offense most often charged, it is the sole substantive RICO violation discussed in
this Article.
19. This is not to say that § 1964(c) presents the only obstacle to a civil claim. A care-
ful examination of a range of opinions reveals that, at the analytical level, courts have
parsed the RICO statute into words and phrases and found those constituents pregnant
with meaning. Now, nearly every word in the statute has attained an independent signifi-
cance and constitutes a separate element to be pled and proven. The author has outlined
these elements elsewhere. See Randy D. Gordon, Parsing Civil RICO: An Outline of Pleading
and Proof Requirements for Fraud-Based Claims Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), TEX. Bus. LITIG., Fall
2001, at 5, 5-12.
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they offer, at least in theory, a way to predicate misrepresentation
complaints on a federal statute that has elements that are at once uni-
form across the United States and different from those of common-
law fraud.
B. Foundation of a Fraud-Based RICO Claim
To understand the importance of the "by reason of' (causation)
element, it is important to consider at the outset the required founda-
tion for a typical fraud-based RICO claim. While this discussion is by
no means comprehensive, as fraud is not the only act upon which to
predicate a claim, even a cursory review of the case law reveals that a
significant percentage of civil RICO claims include a charge of
fraud.20
The § 1964(c) inquiry involves three steps. First, to establish that
a defendant committed "racketeering activity," as defined in
§ 1961 (1) and required by § 1962(c), a plaintiff must show indictable
acts (i.e., "predicate" acts) in violation of one of the enumerated stat-
utes2l-mail fraud, 22 wire fraud, 23 and interstate transportation of
fraudulently obtained money24 are the most commonly asserted. Sec-
ond, § 1962(c) 2 5 requires that a defendant must be a "person em-
ployed by or associated with an[ ] enterprise" 26 and that the
20. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Watson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1031 (W.D. Ark. 2000).
("'[A] high percentage of civil RICO cases, unlike typical antitrust cases, involve fraud
claims."' (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191 (1997))). As of 1985, "of
the 270 known civil RICO cases at the trial court level, 40% involved securities fraud, 37%
common-law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only 9% 'allegations of crimi-
nal activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals."' Sedima, 473 U.S. at
499 n.16 (quoting ABA SECTION OF CORP., BANKING, & Bus. LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc
CIL RICO TASK FORCE 55-56 (1985)). Additionally, "[r]oughly two fifths [sic] of all civil
actions under RICO are based on charges that the defendant committed mail or wire
fraud." Horace D. Nalle, Jr., Civil RICO Claims Predicated on Mail or Wire Fraud: The Indispens-
ability of Reliance, 109 BANKING L.J. 272, 272 (1992).
21. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1962(c), 1964(c) (2000); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 (stating
that "'racketeering activity' consists of no more and no less than commission of a predicate
act" listed in § 1961(1)).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
23. See id. § 1343.
24. See id. § 2314.
25. Section 1962(c) is the most frequently charged violation of RICO. SMITH & REED,
supra note 9, 5.01, at 5-2.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The concept of "enterprise" is the sine qua non of any RICO
claim and the characteristic that distinguishes a RICO claim from an ordinary tort claim.
See Bonner v. Henderson, 147 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1998) ("By the very language of the
statute, the existence of an enterprise is an essential element of a RICO claim."); Chang v.
Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that RICO's focus is on organized
crime, therefore the finding of an organizational nexus is at the heart of a scheme actionable
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defendant must have "conduct[ed] or participat[ed], directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity."27 Third, under § 1964(c), a complaining civil
party must be a "person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of § 1962."'28
As this three-part framework suggests, a plaintiff must demon-
strate crimes at two levels (i.e., at the predicate act level and at the
§ 1962 level) and have standing to seek redress for those crimes under
§ 1964(c).29 Proof of RICO-fraud, then, must necessarily be multi-
layered and certainly different in degree (and often greater in kind)
than proof of common-law fraud.30
under RICO); United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The central
role of the concept of enterprise under RICO cannot be overstated.").
RICO defines the term "enterprise" to include (1) "any individual, partnership, corpo-
ration, association, or other legal entity," and (2) "any union or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
An association-in-fact sufficient to satisfy the RICO enterprise requirement must meet
three criteria: (1) it "must have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of racke-
teering;" (2) it "must be an ongoing organization;" and (3) "its members must function as
a continuing unit as shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision making structure."
Goldin, Peiser & Peiser, L.L.P. v. Delta Brands, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-0127-M, 2002 WL 550450,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2002) (citing Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d
241, 244 (5th Cir.1988)).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Again, § 1962(c) is intended to prevent the operation of a
legitimate business through racketeering. See SMITH & REED, supra note 9, 5.01, at 5-2. It
thus forbids any person from conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (emphasis added). Consequently, "to state a violation of
subsection (c), the alleged RICO person and the alleged RICO enterprise must be dis-
tinct." Andrews v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 673, 687 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
Thus, plaintiffs would need to "plead specific facts which establish that the association
exists for purposes other than simply to commit the predicate acts." Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877,
881 (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); see also Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 178
F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999) ("That is a conspiracy, but it is not an enterprise unless every
conspiracy is also an enterprise for RICO purposes, which the case law denies.").
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
29. Teresa Bryan et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM. CRiM. L.
REv. 987, 1030-33 (2003).
30. For instance, a plaintiff must show that the predicate acts alleged are related and
that they "amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." H.J. Inc. v. Northwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). Thus a single act of fraud-even one with
enormous consequences-is beyond RICO's purview. By contrast, common-law fraud gen-
erally consists of three elements: (1) a material false statement made with an intent to
deceive; (2) the victim's justifiable reliance on the statement; and (3) damages. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). Most-if not all-jurisdictions have adopted
some variation of this language. For example, to establish fraud under Texas law, a plaintiff
must demonstrate the following:
(1) a material representation was made; (2) the representation was false; (3) the
speaker made the representation knowing it was false or made it recklessly with-
out any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the speaker made
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C. Introduction to the Problem of Causation: The Anatomy of a
RICO Claim Based on Mail or Wire Fraud
The multi-layered structure required to prove RICO-fraud can be
demonstrated by examining RICO claims based on mail or wire fraud.
An examination of how these claims are structured also introduces the
debate about whether reliance is required to prove causation in fraud-
based RICO actions.
Many academic discussions of fraud-based claims proceed from
the false premise that civil RICO provides a universal private right of
action for violations of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.3 1 This,
however, ignores both the substantive elements of § 1962(c) and the
standing requirements of § 1964(c). The inquiry is more complicated.
A plaintiff must do more than show that a defendant committed an
act for which the government could indict him under the mail or wire
fraud statutes. He must first show that this mail or wire fraud was part
of a "pattern of racketeering. '3 2 Next, he must demonstrate a nexus
between this pattern and the operation of an "enterprise" for which,
again, the government could indict him.3 3 Yet this is still not enough.
Finally, the plaintiff must go further and establish that he suffered
injury "by reason of' these indictable acts. 34
Litigating under this framework suggests that advancing or de-
fending a civil RICO claim is akin to playing three-dimensional chess:
sections 1961, 1962, and 1964 become separate, though related, bat-
tlegrounds. Much confusion has arisen out of this three-part structure,
particularly with respect to questions of how, or precisely at what
point, a plaintiff must demonstrate causation. At least part of the
problem springs from the difference between what the government
must prove to convict a defendant of mail or wire fraud and what a
private plaintiff must prove to recover for that same fraud. Many liti-
gants and commentators-either by design or indifference-do not
the representation with the intention that it should be relied upon by the party;
(5) the party acted in reliance upon the misrepresentation; and (6) the party
thereby suffered injury.
Norman v. Apache Corp. 19 F.3d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1994).
31. See generally Courtney Chetty Genco, Note, Whatever Happened to Durland?: Mail
Fraud, RICO, and Justifiable Reliance, 68 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 333 (1992); Goldsmith & Til-
ton, supra note 4; Michael A. Hanzman, Establishing Injury "By Reason Of' Racketeering Activ-
ity, FLA. Bus. J., Mar. 2003, at 36.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 1964(c).
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appreciate the importance of RICO's structure. 35 Consequently, they
accuse courts of wild inconsistency in the causation standards applica-
ble in private RICO-fraud cases. 36 This is especially true with respect
to whether reliance must be proven in a RICO-fraud case. A close tex-
tual reading, however, resolves most of the putative inconsistencies by
revealing that there are two distinct lines of cases as to whether and
when reliance must be proven: one line makes pronouncements
about the elements of mail and wire fraud, the other about the mean-
ing of § 1964(c)'s "by reason of' standard.
The root of the problem is found in the difference between mail
or wire fraud and common-law fraud. There are important differences
between the two, but the gulf is not nearly as wide as many have ar-
gued.37 True, for decades courts have applied the mail and wire fraud
statutes to conduct that would not constitute fraud at common law
because the conduct did not involve a misrepresentation. 38 This appli-
35. Instead, they needlessly debate the issue of reliance. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Tilton,
supra note 4, at 88 (asserting that "lower courts have erroneously... [ruled] that RICO
requires proof of reliance[;]" that "reliance is not an element of mail and wire fraud[;]"
and that "courts have nevertheless read reliance into the RICO statute"). Not surprisingly,
most RICO-fraud plaintiffs tend to promote this reading of the statute. See, e.g., Heden v.
Hill, 937 F. Supp. 1230, 1243 (S.D. Tex. 1996). In Heden, the court denied class certifica-
tion in part because, "[ujnlike in criminal RICO prosecutions, civil RICO plaintiffs must
allege and prove reliance in cases using the mail and wire fraud statutes as predicate of-
fenses." Id. In this case, the court found that "although there [was] evidence presented
concerning misrepresentations or omissions of material fact" by the defendant, the plain-
tiff"[did] not show that these misrepresentations or omissions were made to him, either by
mail or wire, or relied upon by him." -d.
Other lower courts, however, have subscribed to misguided logic. District courts in the
Seventh Circuit, for example, have repeatedly certified RICO classes predicated on mail or
wire fraud after stating that proof of reliance is not required. See, e.g., Garner v. Healy, 184
F.R.D. 598, 602 n.4 (N.D. I11. 1999) ("[Ijndividual reliance [is not] an element of a RICO
claim based upon mail and wire fraud."); In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 295, 300
(N.D. Ill. 1999) ("Individual reliance is not an element of a claim ... tinder RICO that is
predicated on acts of mail and wire fraud. . . .");Johnson v. Aronson Furniture Co., No. 96
C 117, 1998 WL 641342, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998) ("Individual reliance... is not an
element of a RICO claim based on mail fraud . . . ."); Ruiz v. Stewart Assocs., Inc., 171
F.R.D. 238, 240-41 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("RICO requires only causation, not reliance.").
36. As we shall also see, though, some courts have announced standards that, if taken
literally and applied across the board, would stifle claims that should be actionable.
37. See, e.g., Genco, supra note 31, at 335-36 (arguing that "[d]espite the Supreme
Court's clear teachings, the circuit courts are mistakenly reading common-law limitations
taken from the jurisprudence of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses and the
tort of deceit into the law of mail fraud when it is civilly enforced through [RICO]").
38. See, e.g., United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1995) (unautho-
rized selling of satellite broadcasting decryption devices); United States v. Lang, 904 F.2d
618, 627 (11 th Cir. 1990) (check kiting-a process used to deprive banks of money); Atlas
Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 1989) (manipulation of
contract payments); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27, 28 (1987) (embezzlement
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cation has arguably been based on misreadings of Durland v. United
States, 3 9 the seminal case interpreting the mail fraud statute. But this
application is at once wrong and, as a practical matter, irrelevant.
First, in Neder v. United States,40 the United States Supreme Court re-
cently confirmed that (1) the mail fraud statute incorporated the well-
settled common law requirement that a fraud claim be based on "a
misrepresentation or concealment of material fact"41 and (2) Durland
did not cast its net as widely as some had supposed. The Court stated:
[In Durland w]e rejected the argument that "the statute reaches
only such cases as, at common law, would come within the defini-
tion of 'false pretenses,' in order to make out which there must be
a misrepresentation as to some existing fact and not a mere prom-
ise as to the future." Instead, we construed the statute to "includ[e]
everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or
present, or suggestions and promises as to the future." Although
Durland held that the mail fraud statute reaches conduct that
would not have constituted "false pretenses" at common law, it did
not hold . . . that the statute encompasses more than common-law
fraud. 42
Second, even a cursory review of case law demonstrates that
nearly every fraud-based RICO claim is predicated on an allegation
that someone lied-either affirmatively or by omission-about some-
thing. Thus, objections that the federal fraud statutes reach conduct
beyond that involving misrepresentations are more apparent than
real.
Now this is not to say that the elements of mail or wire fraud are
coterminous with common-law fraud. Mail fraud and wire fraud do
not require proof of reliance or damages, 43 because those statutes are
designed to strike preemptively, as well as retrospectively, at fraud.
The Supreme Court stated that "[b]y prohibiting the 'scheme to de-
fraud' rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and
damages would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes that Congress
enacted."44 Accordingly, for years courts have held that a RICO plain-
tiff need not prove reliance to establish predicate acts of mail or wire
and misappropriation of information); United States v. Fischl, 797 F.2d 306, 311 (6th Cir.
1986) (kickback scheme); United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1982)
(money laundering); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (bribery);
see also Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 87.
39. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
40. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
41. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
42. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 24-25.
44. Id. at 25.
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fraud. 45 Nevertheless, this rule begs the ultimate question presented
by this Article-specifically, What must a plaintiff prove to show that
he was injured "by reason of' those predicate acts?
H. The Importance of Causation in Civil RICO
The importance of particular elements of a civil RICO claim has
shifted over time. While courts in the 1980s placed particular empha-
sis on RICO's pattern and injury requirements, 46 the current empha-
sis has been on civil RICO's causation standard, which derives from
§ 1964(c)'s "by reason of' language. In particular, the courts have de-
bated the question of whether a plaintiff must prove reliance to estab-
lish a claim. This question has gained special importance in the class-
action context, where any claim that requires individual proof of reli-
ance sounds the death knell for a putative class. 47 Any satisfactory an-
swer must therefore consider (1) the threshold standards for proving
RICO causation, (2) the extent to which reliance bears on particular
types of cases, and (3) how these sub-issues impact the possibility of
class-certification of RICO-fraud claims. In conducting this analysis, it
is helpful to recall that RICO's civil remedies provision is narrower
than both RICO's criminal provision and ordinary civil fraud.
It is one thing to argue that Congress decided to combat fraud by
empowering the government to prosecute and punish false statements
in commercial or consumer transactions without proving that the citi-
45. See, e.g., Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 482 (5th
Cir. 1986) (distinguishing RICO mail fraud from common-law fraud and stating that "[t]o
find a violation of the federal mail fraud statute it is not necessary that the victim have
detrimentally relied on the mailed misrepresentations").
46. The focus on RICO's pattern requirement stemmed largely from "the celebrated
footnote 14 of the Sedima decision and that footnote's enigmatic suggestion that the statu-
tory definition of a 'pattern of racketeering activity' could provide a key to confining the
scope of RICO, particularly in its civil applications." See PAUL A. BATiSTA, C, L RICO PRAC-
TICE MANtUAI § 2.19, at 34 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.,
473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985)). "Literally hundreds-if not several thousand-of reported
federal decisions between 1985 and 1989 considered Sedimas footnote 14 and its terse
discussion of the definition of a 'pattern of racketeering activity.'" Id. at 34 n. 7 3. The
Sedima Court also rejected the notion that a private plaintiff must establish a special "racke-
teering injury"-an injury distinct from any injury arising from the predicate acts them-
selves. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495. In reaction to a rapid increase in private civil RICO actions
during the early 1980s, various federal district courts prior to Sedima had required civil
plaintiffs to allege a racketeering injury, racketeering enterprise injury, or competitive in-
jury distinct from any injury caused directly by the defendant's commission of the predi-
cate acts. See John L. Koenig, Comment, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supretne
Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 Am. U. L. Riv. 821, 824-27
(1986).
47. For a specific discussion of class-action issues, see infra Part III.
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zenry relied on those false statements. It is quite another thing, how-
ever, to maintain that Congress intended RICO to permit a private
party to recover treble damages for a false statement upon which no
one relied. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a false statement that could
cause injury without someone believing the statement and acting in reli-
ance on it. 4 8 In most cases, causation and reliance amount to the same
thing.49 Even the exceptions that follow do not suggest that reliance
has no place in the analysis of a RICO claim.
A. The General Standards for Proof of Causation Provided
by Holmes
Plaintiffs may recover civilly for RICO violations only if they can
demonstrate injury "by reason of' those violations. 50 The United
States Supreme Court first construed this standard in Holmes v. Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp.5 1 In Holmes, the plaintiff, Securities Investor
Protection Corporation ("SIPC"), which was a private nonprofit cor-
poration formed under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1980
and designed to restore funds to investors with assets in the hands of
failed brokerage firms, paid several million dollars to cover claims of
customers of two failed broker-dealers.5 2 SIPC alleged that seventy-five
defendants participated in a fraudulent stock-manipulation scheme
involving six companies. 53 This scheme caused the two broker-dealers
to fail.5 4 SIPC sued as the subrogee of the customers of the broker-
dealers who had not purchased the manipulated securities but were
nonetheless injured when the broker-dealers collapsed. 55 The Court
was thus called upon to decide whether a plaintiff has standing to sue
for a RICO violation inflicted on a third party where the third party's
injury in turn injures the plaintiff.56 The legal question presented was
48. See, e.g., In re Mastercard Int'l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 496 (E.D. La. 2001) ("As
to the alleged wire fraud, plaintiffs do not even allege that they were aware of such activi-
ties; therefore plaintiffs could not rely upon an activity of which they were not aware."); 3
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 890 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
1941) ("Unless an untrue statement is believed and acted upon, it can occasion no legal
injury.").
49. In logical terms reliance is often sufficient to prove causation, even though it may
not always be necessary to do so. The calculus is, however, rather more complicated than
this formulation would suggest. See infra Part II.B.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
51. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
52. See id. at 261-63.
53. Id. at 262-63.
54. See id. at 261.
55. See id. at 261-62.
56. See id. at 265.
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framed as whether a showing of but-for causation is sufficient to con-
fer standing. 5
7
At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the statute's "lan-
guage can ... be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason of
a RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that
the defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the de-
fendant's violation was a 'but for' cause of plaintiffs injury." 58 Yet the
Court quickly dismissed this literal reading, principally based on an
inference of Congressional intent.59
As noted earlier, Congress modeled § 1964(c) on section 4 of the
Clayton Act, which is the civil action provision of the antitrust laws.
60
That provision was in turn modeled on section 7 of the Sherman
Act.6 1 Both section 762 and section 463 had been held to "incorporate
common-law principles of proximate causation." 64 The Holmes court
thus easily found that this reasoning based on statutory pedigree ap-
plied just as readily to § 1964(c):
We may fairly credit the 91st Congress, which enacted RICO, with
knowing the interpretation federal courts had given the words ear-
lier Congresses had used first in § 7 of the Sherman Act and later
in the Clayton Act's § 4. It used the same words, and we can only
57. See id. at 265-66.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 266 ("This construction is hardly compelled, however, and the very unlikeli-
hood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover persuades us
that RICO should not get such an expansive reading.").
60. See Clayton Act of 1914, ch, 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1982)); Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267 ("We have repeatedly observed that Congress
modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws [and] § 4 of
the Clayton Act .... " (citations omitted)).
61. "Congress enacted § 4 in 1914 with language borrowed from § 7 of the Sherman
Act, passed 24 years earlier." Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 530-33 (1983)). See Sherman Antitrust Act,
ch. 647, § 7 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7).
62. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533-534 & n.29); see also Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (holding that as a matter of law, a
stockholder and creditor of a corporation that was injured by an antitrust violation could
not recover treble damages under section 7 because the stockholder's injury was too "indi-
rect, remote, and consequential"); Ames v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 823 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1909) (holding that a plaintiff whose stock was rendered worthless during an illegal
corporate takeover had no legally cognizable section 7 claim because the injury to the
stockholder could not be distinguished from any injury sustained by the company itself).
63. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267-68. Congressional use of the section 7 language in section
4 had led the Court to conclude in Associated General Contractors that "a plaintiffs right to
sue under § 4 required a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for'
cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well." Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, 459 U.S. at 534).
64. Id. at 267.
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assume it intended them to have the same meaning that courts had
already given them. 65
Reasoning from this historical perspective, the Court concluded that
"[p]roximate cause is thus required. 66
The Court, however, declined to articulate a specific test for de-
termining proximate cause; instead, it opted to employ the term as a
generic shorthand for "the judicial tools used to limit a person's re-
sponsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts." 67 In a
brief elaboration on this limitation-of-liability theme, the Court re-
ferred to three policy objectives, discernable from analogous antitrust
cases. These objectives were served by the common-law rule that de-
mands "some direct relation between the injury asserted and the inju-
rious conduct alleged."68 First, "the less direct an injury is, the more
difficult it becomes" to differentiate damages stemming from a viola-
tion from those that are attributable to other factors.69 Second, indi-
rect injuries create apportionment problems because recognizing
both direct and indirect injuries raises the specter of double recov-
eries. 70 Third, those directly injured may generally be counted on to
serve as private attorneys general. 7 '
Ultimately, since the Holmes decision, it is clear that a plaintiff
who complains of harm "merely from the misfortunes visited upon a
third person" will "stand at too remote a distance to recover. ' 72 It is
also true, however, that the Court refused "to announce a black-letter
65. Id. at 268 (citations omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. The Court observed that "[a ] t bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects
'ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and convenient.'" Id.
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)).
68. Id. As one leading nineteenth-century treatise explained:
The chief and sufficient reason for this rule is to be found in the impossibility of
tracing consequences through successive steps to the remote cause, and the ne-
cessity of pausing in the investigation of the chain of events at the point beyond
which experience and observation convince us we cannot press our inquiries with
safety.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAw OF TORTS 73 (2d ed. 1888).
69. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
70. Id.; see also Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533-44; Blue Shield of Va. v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473-475 (1982); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251,
264 (1972).
71. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542).
72. Id. at 268-69; see also 1 J.G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
55-56 (1882). Sutherland states:
Where the plaintiff sustains injury from the defendant's conduct to a third person, it is too
remote, if the plaintiff sustains no other than a contract relation to such third per-
son, or is under contract obligation on his account, and the injury consists only in
impairing the ability or inclination of such third person to perform his part, or in
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rule" and that it would "not rule out" that third parties could state a
claim of fraud. 73 It is within this gap between the general rule against
third-party claims and the refusal to categorically rule them out that
litigants have generated the most friction.
B. The Relationship Between Reliance and Causation Left
Uncertain by Holmes
Although Holmes definitively settled the then-open question of
whether both but-for and proximate causation must be pled and
proven in a civil RICO case, it did little concretely to explain exactly
how plaintiffs must do so, especially in misrepresentation cases. The
Court did, however, set forth principles sufficient to guide further
analysis. The key is, as learned from Holmes, the common law.
The common law did not develop a one-size-fits-all causation stan-
dard. For instance, relatively more remote consequences may be ac-
tionable when a causal act was intentional, as opposed to merely
negligent.74 Additionally, when an intentional act is a misrepresenta-
tion-as opposed to a tortious act whose consequences can be more
clearly traced from act to injury (battery, for example)-the common
law came to demand proportionality of remedy. 75 Consequently, not
every recipient of a misrepresentation may recover:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liabil-
ity to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has rea-
son to expect to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the
misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss suffered by them through
their justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he in-
tends or has reason to expect their conduct to be influenced.
76
Thus, "[i]f the misrepresentation has not in fact been relied upon by
the recipient in entering into a transaction in which he suffers pecuni-
ary loss, the misrepresentation is not in fact a cause of the loss."
7 7
The Second Restatement therefore combines misrepresentation,
reliance, and causation in a negative way. It does not say that causa-
increasing the plaintiff's expense or labor of fulfilling such contract, unless the
wrongful act is willful for that purpose.
Id. at 55.
73. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 nn.19-20.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435B cmt. a (1965) ("[Rlesponsibility for
harmful consequences should be carried further in the case of one who does an intention-
ally wrongful act than in the case of one who is merely negligent or is not at fault.").
75. See Moore v. PaineWebber Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 176-78 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi,J.,
concurring); David A. Curran, Funds v. Big Tobacco and the Proximate-Cause Issue: A Framework
for Derivative Injuries, 80 TEX. L. REv. 393, 404-05 (2001).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1977).
77. Id. § 546 cmt. a.
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tion must be proven by a demonstration of reliance. Rather, it states
that causation cannot be proven if a misrepresentation was not relied
upon. This distinction seems to elude those who argue that the entire
concept of reliance is "misplaced" in a RICO analysis. 78 In any event,
the Restatement view, which turns on the related notions of transac-
tional inducement and loss causation, helps clarify what but-for and
proximate causation should mean in a fraud-based RICO claim.
The Second Circuit has a well-developed body of case law that
considers the various faces of causation. In Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc.,79
the Second Circuit held that a RICO plaintiff must plead and prove
both "transaction causation" and "loss causation."80 To show transac-
tion causation, the court explained that "the plaintiffs must demon-
strate that but for the defendant's wrongful acts, the plaintiffs would
not have entered into the transactions that resulted in their losses."81
Meanwhile, to show loss causation "the plaintiffs must show that the
defendants' misstatements or omissions were 'the reason the transac-
tion[s] turned out to be .. . losing one[s] .'"82 In a lengthy concur-
rence, Judge Calabresi elaborated on this holding and provided a
helpful discussion of RICO causation in the relatively familiar terms of
common-law tort causation.8 3
78. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 83.
79. 189 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 171-72.
81. Id. at 172.
82. Id. (quoting First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769
(1994)).
83. Judge Calabresi stated:
For a fraud-related RICO suit to lie, the plaintiffs must show transaction causa-
tion. To do this, it is frequently said, the plaintiff must demonstrate that but for
the defendant's wrongful acts the plaintiff would not have entered into the trans-
action that resulted in his or her losses....
For purposes of proving transaction causation, but-for cause is typically
treated as both a necessary and a sufficient condition....
But showing that the defendant's wrongful acts led the plaintiffs to enter into
the transaction is not enough. For a RICO suit to lie, the plaintiffs must also
demonstrate that the defendant's wrongful acts were responsible for the loss that
occurred. The plaintiffs must, in other words, demonstrate with respect to that
loss, the existence of all three of the traditional common-law elements of causa-
tion (but-for, causal link, and proximate cause). This jurisdictional requirement,
which is normally termed "loss causation," is, in fact, not significantly different
from the standard tort law requirement that a defendant's acts cause not only an
accident but also the injury to the plaintiff that followed from the accident. In the
typical common-law negligence context, however, the showing of causality with
respect to the accident usually suffices to demonstrate causality with respect to
the injury, and so the causal requirements are not given separate names.
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In sum, plaintiffs must show that a misrepresentation or omission
caused them to enter into a transaction and that the misrepresentation
or omission caused a pecuniary loss. Framed in this clear fashion,
RICO's causation requirement-whether articulated in terms of reli-
ance or not-necessarily has an enormous impact on pleading and
proof standards.84
I. Reliance, Causation, and the Question of Certifiability of
Fraud-Based RICO Claims Under Rule 23(b)(3)15:
Holmes's Impact on Class Certification in Civil
RICO Cases
The elephant in the room during many discussions of RICO cau-
sation is the context in which the standard for proving causation mat-
ters most: class actions. No one has credibly argued that strict
causation standards (often stated in terms of reliance) have proved an
impediment to otherwise meritorious individual suits. The same can-
not be said of strict causation standards in class actions. Therefore, it
is important to consider this important contextual issue.
In the wake of a series of cases from the 1990s, most notably Cas-
tano v. American Tobacco Co. 8 6 and In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,8 7 it has
What is true in negligence cases is also true in fraud cases (and hence in
RICO-fraud cases) insofar as but-for cause is concerned. Thus, in the typical fraud
case, but for the plaintiffs entry into the transaction, he or she would not have
suffered the loss at all. With respect to this element of causation, therefore, what
is needed to show transaction causation normally suffices to prove loss causation
as well. And a showing that, absent the defendant's wrongdoing, the plaintiff
would not have been part of the deal that went wrong is enough to show the
requisite sine qua non relationship to the loss suffered.
It is quite different with respect to the second element, i.e., causal link or
tendency. This requirement, which is rarely a problem in the standard negligence
case, is not infrequently the essence of the loss-causation question in a fraud situa-
tion, and therefore in a RICO-fraud case.
Id. at 174-76 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted).
84. Some courts equate transaction causation with reliance. See D.E. &J L.P. v. Cona-
way, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2003). "'Transaction causation,' another way of
describing reliance, is established when the misrepresentations or omissions cause the plain-
tiff to engage in the transaction in question. As such, transaction causation is akin to 'ac-
tual' or 'but for' causation." Id. (citing Robbins v. Kroger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447
(11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added)). Other courts associate reliance with proximate cause.
See Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 219 (5th
Cir. 2003) ("Proximate cause generally demands that a misrepresentation be relied upon
by the plaintiff, individually.").
85. FED R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
86. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
87. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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become nearly impossible to certify nationwide classes based on state
statutory or common law.88 Plaintiffs have thus begun to cast about for
a federal law to avoid this difference-in-state-law obstacle. At least
facially, RICO is an attractive option because it provides a vehicle from
which to assert fraud claims. But in many cases, plaintiffs have found
that they have merely traded the variations-in-state-law roadblock for
another-namely, the difficulty of proving causation on a class-wide
basis. Thus, it is imperative to review the most often discussed cases
and determine whether the causation problem is one that springs
from the structure of the RICO statute itself or whether, as some have
argued,8 9 this problem has arisen from mis- or over-readings of
Holmes's proximate cause requirement.
The debate is typically framed in terms of whether a plaintiff
must show reliance on allegedly fraudulent statements or omissions. 90
At first blush, the circuit courts seem to be divided on the question. At
one extreme, the First Circuit recently held that
reliance is a specialized condition that happens to have grown up
with common law fraud. Reliance is doubtless the most obvious way
in which fraud can cause harm, but it is not the only way ....
There is no good reason here to depart from RICO's literal lan-
guage by importing a reliance requirement into RICO.9 1
At the other extreme, the Eleventh Circuit periodically recon-
firms its earlier pronouncement that a civil RICO plaintiff alleging
mail or wire fraud as predicate acts "must prove that he was 'a target
of the scheme to defraud' and that he 'relied to his detriment on
misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme."' 9 2
Although their outcomes are seemingly contradictory, these cases
do not lead to the conclusion that the courts are irretrievably split.
Rather, the courts appear to be making the sort of case-by-case inquir-
ies inherent in the Holmes Court's decision to eschew a bright-line test
for determining causation. Moreover, the lower courts are, quite sensi-
88. "Based primarily on the burden of applying multiple states' laws, an overwhelming
number of federal courts have denied certification of nationwide state-law class actions."
Rory Ryan, Comment, Uncertifiable?: The Current Status of Nationwide State-Law Class Actions,
54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 470 & n.5 (2002) (citing roughly seventy federal cases since 1985-
among them Castano and Rhone-Poulenc-denying class certification for this reason).
89. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 103-04 (arguing that "courts have
ignored the expansive evolution of fraud legislation and have adopted precisely the formal-
istic approach to proximate cause that Holmes eschewed").
90. See supra Part I.C.
91. Sys. Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2002).
92. Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Pelletier v.
Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996).
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bly, developing schemes for analyzing causation by the category of
fraud, for instance, based on certain recurring patterns involving the
person to whom an alleged misrepresentation was made.
A. Class Action Certification of RICO-Fraud Claims Does Not
Turn on the Issue of Reliance
Because no one can credibly argue that reliance is an element
that must be pled and proven in every conceivable case, 93 in many
respects, the debate over whether reliance is an element of fraud-
based RICO claims is more important in theoryothan in practice. Just
as certainly, no one can credibly argue that reliance is irrelevant in a
case hinging on misrepresentations or omissions. Why does all this
matter? Again, the reliance requirement impacts class actions. There
is a well-developed body of general fraud law holding that no fraud
claim can be certified as a class action if individual reliance must be
proven at trial. 94 Absent a presumption of reliance (or some other way
of demonstrating reliance with common proof), fraud cases cannot be
certified.
Given this obstacle, plaintiffs have seized on two distinguishing
features of RICO (as opposed to common-law) fraud. First, the predi-
cate act of mail or wire fraud does not require proof of reliance. 95
Second, the standing requirement of civil RICO is defined in terms of
causation, not reliance. 96 By invoking these key distinctions, plaintiffs
hope to distinguish between their RICO claims and ordinary fraud
claims, the latter of which they often readily concede to be uncertifi-
able under existing precedent. But do these distinctions really matter?
Furthermore, have the courts, as several commentators have sug-
gested, made a mess of this corner of the law and established wildly
different standards? The best way to answer these questions is to ex-
amine the most often discussed cases.
In many cases, the litigants talk past one another. Plaintiffs take
the flat-footed position that certification should be liberally granted
because RICO claims do not require proof of reliance. Defendants, on
the other hand, take the equally extreme position that RICO claims
93. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 126 ("[V]ictim reliance is sufficient-but
not always necessary---to show proximate cause.").
94. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A] fraud
class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an issue." (citing Simon v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973))).
95. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).
96. See 42 U.S.C. 1964(c) (2000); Loiselle, 303 F.3d at 103.
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are never susceptible to certification because reliance is implicitly an
element and it always destroys the requirement of the predominance
of common issues. Along the way, both sides are prone to mix the
analytical frameworks that courts have developed for recurring, yet
very different, fact patterns. This makes it appear as if there are nu-
merous and profound circuit splits on a range of fundamental issues.
What one finds in the case law, however, is that different outcomes are
generally attributable to different fact patterns. Indeed, one need only
answer two critical questions to determine whether any particular case
is likely to turn on individual questions of causation or reliance that
would make certification inappropriate:
(1) Were the alleged misrepresentations or omissions uniform or
individualized?
(2) Were the alleged misrepresentations or omissions directed to
the plaintiff or to a third party?
In light of these questions, discussions as to whether RICO re-
quires a showing of reliance in any or all circumstances or whether the
plaintiff in a RICO case must always be the party to whom the misrep-
resentation was made will never yield useful results. In fact, the reli-
ance imbroglio often obscures a fundamental issue: Should any court,
in evaluating a motion to certify a RICO-fraud case as a class action,
dismiss evidence that members of a putative class did not rely on the
facts allegedly misrepresented (or knew the facts and had an opportu-
nity to act in avoidance)?9 7 Framed in this manner, the answer is
plainly no. A lack of reliance should never be deemed irrelevant to
the question of whether misrepresentations or omissions have caused
injury. Accordingly, nearly all courts recognize that the presence of
individual issues of reliance destroys predominance under Rule
97. See, e.g., Summit Props., Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 F.3d 556, 560 n.19
(5th Cir. 2000) ("If the relevant decisionmakers [sic] knew the limitations of the product
but would have bought it anyway because of its low price, for example, the fraud would not
have been a 'but for' cause of the plaintiffs' damages.").
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23(b) (3).98 Finally, case law prohibits analyzing certifiability strictly in
terms of reliance.99
1. Certifiable RICO-Fraud Claims Must Not Turn on
Individualized Misrepresentations That Raise Individual
Causation Questions
Many courts have recognized that in a direct misrepresentation
case common issues will not predominate if allegedly fraudulent state-
ments are not uniform (or nearly so). This observation is consistent
with-even inherent in-Rule 23's predominance requirement:
It is only where . . .predominance exists that economies can be
achieved by means of the class-action device. In this view, a fraud
perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepre-
sentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it
may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the
class. On the other hand, although having some common core, a
fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there
was material variation in the representations made or in the kinds
or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were
addressed. 0 0
In the RICO context, the predominance element of Rule
23(b) (3) means that proof of a central, coordinated scheme to de-
98. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) ("Requiring proof of
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would
have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues
then would have overwhelmed the common ones."); Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc.,
265 F.3d 178, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that where "plaintiffs were not entitled to a pre-
sumption of reliance," the district court "did not abuse its discretion in concluding the
plaintiffs failed to establish the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)"); Broussard v.
Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[B]ecause reliance
'must be applied with factual precision,' plaintiffs' fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims do not provide 'a suitable basis for class-wide relief."' (quoting Jensen v. SIPCO,
Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 953 (8th Cir. 1994))).
99. It is in service of a false dichotomy to examine certifiability strictly in terms of
reliance. Case law itself refutes any such contention. In Loiselle for example, the district
court denied class certification prior to trial, even though it applied a non-reliance stan-
dard that the First Circuit ultimately endorsed on appeal. See Loiselle, 303 F.3d at 104; Sys.
Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 138 F. Supp. 2d 78, 81 (D. Mass. 2001). Conversely, in Chisolm v.
TranSouth Financial Corp., the district court certified a class, even though the Fourth Circuit
had held (in an earlier phase of the case) that reliance was an element of the plaintiffs
RICO-fraud claim. See Chisolm v. TranSouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1996);
Chisholm v. TransSouth Fin. Corp., 184 F.R.D. 556, 563 (E.D. Va. 1999). These cases belie
the assertion that a court's view of reliance automatically determines whether RICO-fraud
claims can be certified.
100. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (3) advisory committee's note (1966 amendment), reprinted in
U.S.C.S., COURT RULES: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 23, at 12-13 (Lexis
1998).
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fraud is not sufficient to establish liability across the board for fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. Rather, to recover for fraudulent acts, "even if
that fraud is the result of a common course of conduct, each plaintiff
must prove that he or she personally received a material misrepresen-
tation, and that his or her reliance on this misrepresentation was the
proximate cause of his or her loss."101
This requirement thus suggests a touchstone for separating non-
certifiable fraud claims from potentially certifiable fraud claims:
Fraud actions must . . . be separated into two categories: fraud
claims based on uniform misrepresentations made to all members
of the class and fraud claims based on individualized misrepresen-
tations. The former are appropriate subjects for class certification
because the standardized misrepresentations may be established by
generalized proof. Where there are material variations in the na-
ture of the misrepresentations made to each member of the pro-
posed class, however, class certification is improper because
plaintiffs will need to submit proof of the statements made to each
plaintiff, the nature of the varying material misrepresentations,
and the reliance of each plaintiff upon those misrepresentations in
order to sustain their claims. 10 2
This paradigm provides a useful method for winnowing cases that
are hopelessly uncertifiable because they turn on individualized repre-
sentations that necessarily raise individual questions of causation for
trial. The remaining cases, particularly those based on fairly standard
representations, may or may not be certifiable, depending on the ease
with which receipt of (and causation of injury by) a representation
can be proven.1 0 3 The point here is that "[o]nly if class members re-
101. Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1253 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Gibbs
Props. Corp. v. Cigna Corp., 196 F.R.D. 430, 439 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (declining to certify
class, even though plaintiffs had identified a practice of overcharging "each and every"
putative class member).
102. Moore, 306 F.3d at 1253.
103. Id. at 1255. Plaintiffs have advanced-with limited success-a variety of theories to
overcome the obstacles that remain in a case based on standard representations. Some
have adverted to the fraud-on-the-market theory approved in Levinson, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
"[I]n an open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is deter-
mined by the available material information regarding the company and its business....
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do
not directly rely on the misstatements."' Id. (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154,
1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)). But most courts have declined to apply the doctrine outside the
securities context. See, e.g., Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 666 (9th Cir. 2004);
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., 348 F.3d 417, 435 (4th Cir. 2003); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281
F.3d 1350, 1362 (11th Cir. 2002). But see In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 995 F. Supp. 451,
457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). This case states,
In civil RICO claims, [the Second] Circuit has required a "causal connection be-
tween the prohibited conduct and plaintiff's injury." ... When the predicate acts
or mail and/or fraud are alleged, "to establish the required causal connection,
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ceived materially uniform misrepresentations can generalized proof
be used to establish any element of the fraud. '10 4
2. Plaintiffs May Establish a RICO-Fraud Claim Based on Third-
Party Misrepresentations
The second question in limited circumstances involves cases fall-
ing into two sub-categories: (1) those involving direct misrepresenta-
tions to the plaintiff and (2) those involving misrepresentations to a
third party. A good starting point for the discussion is Sandwich Chef of
Texas, Inc. v. Reliance National Indemnity Insurance Co.,105 a case involv-
ing allegations of both direct and third-party fraud. In that case, the
district court certified a nationwide class of worker's compensation
policyholders whose insurers had allegedly overcharged them.10 6 The
Fifth Circuit, however, found that the district court had done so "by
eliminating, on substantive grounds, plaintiff-specific issues of reli-
ance and causation. 10 7 An analysis of the facts and law leading to this
holding reveals a scope of inquiry that properly focuses on how causa-
tion is to be tried.
The plaintiff alleged that 141 casualty insurers committed mail
and wire fraud over a fourteen-year period by passing the cost of as-
sessments that states made on them (referred to in the opinion as
"residual market loads" or "RMLs") onto their insureds without first
the plaintiff [is] required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations
were relied on."
Id. (citations omitted). See generally SMITH & REED, supra note 9, 6.05. So limited to securi-
ties cases, this theory is of no practical utility because the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 removed most securities violations from RICO's ambit. Pub. L. No. 104-
67, para. 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995). Other plaintiffs point to the presumption of reli-
ance articulated in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)
("[P]ositive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that
the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have consid-
ered them important in the making of this decision."). Still, others have convinced a few
district courts that reliance was obvious or self-proving. See, e.g., Chisolm, 184 F.R.D. at 563:
Spark v. MBNA Corp., 178 F.R.D. 431, 435-36 (D. Del. 1998). For the most part, though,
circuit courts have declined to adopt any of these causation shortcuts. But see Klay v.
Humana, 382 F.3d 1241, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (allowing reliance to be proven using cir-
cumstantial evidence).
104. Moore, 306 F.3d at 1255.
105. 319 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2003).
106. Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indem. Ins. Co., 202 F.R.D. 484, 487
(S.D. Tex. 2001). A slightly more elaborate discussion of this case can be found in the
author's annual RICO update. See Randy D. Gordon, RICO Update, TEX. Bus. LITIG., Spring
2003, at 15, 15-16.
107. Sandwich Chef 319 F.3d at 211.
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obtaining regulatory authorization to do so.' 08 The plaintiff also as-
serted that the defendants corrupted the National Council on Com-
pensation Insurance, a licensed rating bureau and trade association,
and used it as a racketeering enterprise to defraud policyholders and
state insurance regulators.' 0 9 The fraud-causation theory was thus two-
fold: the defendants made false regulatory filings (fraud-on-the-regu-
lator theory) and sent invoices that were inflated with unauthorized
RMLs (invoice theory).1 o
As the court noted, the defendants had a different view of the
facts, asserting that the named plaintiff was not only informed of, but
also negotiated, its RML expenses and bargained for other terms that
were not provided for in rate filings, which reduced the ultimate cost
of its insurance.'11 Against this factual backdrop, the court turned to
its legal analysis, which proceeded from the premise that "[t]he perva-
sive issues of individual reliance that generally exist in RICO-fraud ac-
tions create a working presumption against class certification." 112 The
district court had skirted this reliance/causation presumption in two
ways, both of which purportedly flowed from the Fifth Circuit's opin-
ion in Summit Properties Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.t13 In that case, the
court held that proximate causation could be established where "a
plaintiff has either been the target of a fraud or has relied upon the
fraudulent conduct of the defendants."' '4 The district court had thus
concluded that the plaintiff "could establish proximate cause as to all
the class members through common circumstantial evidence, either
by the target wing or the reliance wing."' "15
108. Id. at 211-12. The court explains this as follows:
Most employers purchase workers' compensation coverage in the voluntary mar-
ket. Those who cannot may obtain insurance through legislatively-established in-
voluntary markets, sometimes called "residual markets," "assigned risk markets,"
or "assigned risk pools." Some states require workers' compensation insurance
carriers to reinsure that state's "residual markets," which often results in addi-
tional costs to them when operating deficits occur. When residual market assess-
ments dramatically increased, insurers responded by factoring residual market
expenses in the price of their voluntary market expenses in the price of their
voluntary market insurance. Insurance program documents identified these ex-
penses as "residual market charges" (also known as "residual market loads" or
"RMLs").
Id.
109. Id. at 211.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 213.
112. Id. at 219.
113. 214 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000).
114. Id. at 561.
115. Sandwich Chef 319 F.3d at 219-20.
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The Fifth Circuit first examined the reliance wing, which in the
district court's view the plaintiff had met through its invoice theory. As
the court described that theory, "[e]ach class member was
overcharged by means of an inflated invoice that affirmatively misrep-
resented that the premium charged was the amount lawfully due."
' 16
The plaintiff asserted that individual reliance was not an obstacle to
certification because (1) the act of payment demonstrated reliance
and (2) expert testimony could show that businesses rely on the accu-
racy of invoices.' 1 7 Regardless, the Fifth Circuit found this reasoning
"legally flawed," principally because it did not account for the defend-
ants' defenses. 1 18 The district court did not adequately consider how
the invoice theory would be tried in light of "evidence that might per-
suade the trier of fact that policyholders knew the amounts being
charged varied from rates filed with regulators and that they had
agreed to pay such premiums."'1 9
The target claim, which the district court deemed satisfied by the
fraud-on-the-regulator allegations, fared no better. The district court
"reasoned that, under the target wing, individual reliance by class
members was not an issue because reliance upon a fraudulent repre-
sentation or omission by a third person was sufficient if the plaintiff
was injured as a result."120 Thus, the plaintiff "could establish proxi-
mate cause by demonstrating that the class members were injured by
the regulators' reliance on defendants' misrepresentations and omis-
116. Id. at 220. When facing a fraud claim turning on the underlying legality or illegal-
ity of particular acts, one is well-advised to consider the source of law against which the
conduct must be measured. This inquiry may reveal a thicket of state law that will have its
own impact on certifiability. At least one court has denied certification of a RICO class on
the following ground: "There is no federal insurance code; each State has its own insur-
ance code, as well as its own Department of Insurance which in turn has its own administra-
tive regulations." Peoples v. Am. Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 637, 642 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
Thus,
[t]he trial of a class case would require the determination, as to each (insurance
product] sale and under the law of each jurisdiction where the [insurance] prod-
uct was sold, of whether the actions complained of were indeed unlawful-
whether the representations made by the sales agents were misrepresentations-a
question of tremendous complexity and difficulty.
Id.
117. See Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indem. Ins. Co., 202 F.R.D. 484,
500-01 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
118. Sandwich Chef 319 F.3d at 220.
119. Id.; see also Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 665 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In
this case, individualized reliance issues related to plaintiffs' knowledge, motivations, and
expectations bear heavily on the causation analysis.").
120. Sandwich Chef, 319 F.3d at 221.
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sions."1 2 1 In holding that the district court erred in invoking the target
theory to excuse individual proof of reliance, the Fifth Circuit made
something more than a mere procedural point. By finding that (1)
the target exception to RICO's general reliance requirement "only
comes into play when the plaintiff can demonstrate injury as a direct
and contemporaneous result of fraud committed against a third
party,"1 22 and (2) the target exception "has clear and constricted pa-
rameters that [the plaintiff] cannot satisfy in this case[,"' 23 the court
tacitly held that the plaintiffs target-based allegations failed to state a
claim.
To further clarify the import of the direct versus third-party fraud
distinction and how it bears on the issue of reliance, a brief review of
other major cases proves helpful. As noted above, the first category
involves allegations that a defendant made a misrepresentation di-
rectly to a plaintiff. There is no case in which a court has allowed a
civil RICO-fraud plaintiff to recover in the face of evidence that it did
not rely on the statements upon which it bases its claim. 124 No court,
however, could properly permit recovery in this circumstance because
causation is lacking if the plaintiff did not rely. Similarly, if the defen-
dant made the alleged misrepresentation to the plaintiff but the plain-
tiff knew it to be false, then the misrepresentation could not cause any
injury.125
The second category of cases in the to-whom-the-representation-
was-made category includes those in which a RICO-fraud plaintiff al-
leged that it was the target of the fraud and suffered a direct injury,
even though the misrepresentation was to a third party. Again, there
are no deep divisions among courts as to whether a plaintiff must rely
on a misrepresentation made only to a third party. If the plaintiff
never hears a misrepresentation, then he has no occasion to rely on it
121. Id.
122. Id. at 223.
123. Id. at 224.
124. This claim is based on the author's research.
125. Id. at 218-19 ("Knowledge of the truth defeats a claim of fraud because it elimi-
nates the deceit as the 'but for' cause of the damages."). Cases cited for the contrary posi-
tion typically address a different issue: whether reliance is an element of mail or wire fraud.
They do not consider the role of reliance in proving causation under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
See, e.g., United Healthcare Corp. v. Am. Trade Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 563, 571 n.5 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting that proof of mail or wire fraud does not require a showing of reliance);
Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1294 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that "the mailings involved"
do not need to be "relied upon"); Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782
F.2d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 1986).
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and the question of its reliance is moot.12 6 Accordingly, the debate
about reliance in the third-party context quickly collapses into one
about "convergence" 127-that is, into assertions that some circuits will
not permit RICO-fraud cases based on misrepresentations to third
parties.1 28 Although there is dictum suggesting that some circuits al-
low recovery whereas others do not,129 careful readings reveal that in
actuality circuit court decisions do not turn on the existence of a sup-
posed convergence rule.' 30
126. This does not mean that the reliance of the third party is irrelevant. See, e.g.,
County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2d Cir. 1990) (sug-
gesting that while it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have relied on the defendant's
misrepresentations, the third party must have relied on them-otherwise the misrepresenta-
tions could not logically have caused the plaintiffs injury).
127. Convergence is the principle that the injured person and the deceived person be
the same. See SMITH & REED, supra note 9, 9.05[2] [a], at 9-59.
128. After McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), some courts relying on a con-
vergence theory required mail fraud plaintiffs to allege that the party deceived by the de-
fendant's conduct was also the party injured. The seminal cases are pure mail or wire fraud
cases-they do not have a RICO overlay. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 38-40
(2d Cir. 1988). Thus, in RICO cases there is good reason to believe that convergence goes
to the question of whether there is a predicate act, not to whether there is causation under
§ 1964(c).
Some courts make the convergence-as-mail-fraud-element distinction fairly explicit,
discussing, for example, indirect fraud both in terms of causation under § 1964(c) and of
convergence under the mail fraud statute. See, e.g., Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Israel
Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (7th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, even many of the
courts that somewhat conflate the two inquiries under a "causation" banner do so in a way
that still requires a separate analysis for each of the constituents and makes it clear that a
bifurcated causation analysis is required because the predicate act alleged is mail or wire
fraud. Unfortunately, though, these cases often confuse (or use interchangeably) reliance,
which is not an element of statutory fraud, with convergence. For example, Chisolm states:
[W] here the predicate act giving rise to civil liability under RICO was alleged to
have been mail fraud, prospective plaintiffs must, in order to demonstrate their
standing to sue, plausibly allege both that they detrimentally relied in some way
on the fraudulent mailing and that the mailing was a proximate cause of the
alleged injury to their business or property.
Chisolm v. TranSouth Finance Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation and footnote
omitted); see also Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 805 F. Supp.
1277, 1292, 1294 (D.S.C. 1992), afffd, 998 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing the same pas-
sage from Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V, 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1074 (D. Md. 1991), to
support both reliance and convergence points).
129. See Evans, 844 F.2d at 39, 40 (stating that "[i]f a scheme to defraud must involve
the deceptive obtaining of property, the conclusion seems logical that the deceived party
must lose some money or property," but also stating that "the case before us today does not
require us to decide this general question"); Corcoran v. Am. Plan Corp. 886 F.2d 16, 20
(2d Cir. 1989) (referring to the Evans language as dictum and declining to follow it).
130. The classic scenario where the target of fraud is the plaintiff, but misrepresenta-
tions are made to third parties involves falsehoods intended to lure customers from the
target to the defendant. Courts have repeatedly found this scenario actionable because
misrepresentations by a competitor to a plaintiffs customers can be the proximate cause of
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For the proposition that reliance is irrelevant to proof of a civil
RICO case based on third-party fraud, many point to Systems Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Loiselle.131 The Loiselle plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dant-contractor misrepresented to a community college that the
contractor was paying the plaintiff employees no less than the statuto-
rily prescribed minimum wage. 132 They further contended that these
misrepresentations proximately caused their injury by depriving the
college of information needed to enforce the contractor's duty to pay
the minimum wage. 133 The First Circuit asserted the viability of a the-
ory of RICO causation on these facts,1 34 but the case is slender author-
ity upon which to rest broad pronouncements as to the general
certifiability of RICO-fraud claims. This is so because the circuit court
considered the case after the district court had found as a matter offact
that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient knowledge to defeat causation.1 35
Indeed, only two of eight plaintiffs were able to prove at trial that the
scheme caused them injury. 1 36 Thus, the case stands for little more
than that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of fraud based on
misrepresentations to a third party. It says nothing about the ultimate
success of this type of claim, especially in cases in which the plaintiff
may know that the facts are not as represented to the third party. Nor
does it say whether such a case involving individualized knowledge
may proceed as a class action. 1 37
Cases cited for the proposition that some circuits require conver-
gence are generally consistent with Loiselle when considered in light of
their facts. For example, in Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Conn,138
the plaintiff was not the target of the alleged fraud. Indeed, "the re-
RICO injury. Conceptually, these cases are fraudulent interference cases-tortious inter-
ference cases in which the tort is fraud. See Commercial Cleaning Servs., LLC v. Colin Serv.
Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 381-85 (2d Cir. 2001); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242
F.3d 539, 544-45 (5th Cir. 2001); Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U. S. Healthcare, Inc., 140
F.3d 494, 521 (3d Cir. 1998); Israel Travel, 61 F.3d at 1257-58; Mid-At. Telecom, Inc. v.
Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F.3d 260, 263-64 (4th Cir. 1994).
131. 303 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2002).
132. See id. at 101-02.
133. See id. at 101-03.
134. See id. at 103-04.
135. SeeSys. Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 112 F. Supp. 2d 112, 119 (D. Mass. 2000). The First
Circuit did not even discuss the Holmes direct-relation test or the issue of causation because
the defendant did not contest causation. See Loiselle, 303 F.3d at 103-04.
136. See Sys. Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 138 F. Supp. 2d 78, 97-99 (D. Mass. 2001).
137. The district court in Loiselle twice denied a motion for class certification. Id. at 81
("On January 18, 2000, and again on May 15, 2000, the Court rebuffed two attempts to
certify the case as a class action.").
138. 5 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1993).
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cord demonstrate [d] that the [defendants] were not even aware of
the existence of [the plaintiffs] until after the commencement of' the
litigation. 139 Thus, the plaintiff could never demonstrate any claim
that the defendants intended to harm it. In other words, the plaintiff
had an impossible case because it could not show that any fraud was
aimed at it.
Pelletier v. ZweifeP40 is also less problematic than some would ar-
gue. Although the Eleventh Circuit in Pelletier stated that a RICO
plaintiff "must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations
made in furtherance of [a] scheme,"' 141 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant in fact made misrepresentations directly to him.142 The
court's statement is therefore dictum in the context of third-party
misrepresentations. 143
General rules are hard to tease from these cases. But that is really
the point: courts are best served when they carefully and individually
evaluate the factual basis of third-party fraud claims.
B. Courts Make Mistakes When They Fail to Follow the Holmes
Directive to Consider Facts Rather than Bright-line
Rules
None of this is to suggest that courts at either end of the spec-
trum always get the causation analysis right when they are faced with
the decision to certify or not certify a class. When they are wrong, it is
usually because they have either forgotten Holmes's admonition to
consider facts rather than bright-line rules or because they failed to
consider how a particular case could be tried. The following examples
illustrate these points.
Although not a class action, Special Purpose Accounts Receivable Co-
operative Corp. v. Prime One Capital Co. 144 presents a case of the former.
There, the court seized on the Eleventh Circuit's "restrictive" view of
139. Id. at 184.
140. 921 F.2d 1465 (l1th Cir. 1991).
141. Id. at 1499-1500.
142. Id. at 1500.
143. Johnson Enterprises ofJacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1318 (11th
Cir. 1998), which quotes Pelletier, is also consistent with the general principles set forth in
the text. As in Conn, the evidence showed that the plaintiff was not the target of the fraudu-
lent scheme. See id. at 1300-01 (describing "greenmail" scheme aimed at third parties).
Even worse for the plaintiff, the court held that no misrepresentation injured it, conclud-
ing that "[i]f anything, the misrepresentations inured to [the plaintiff's] benefit." Id. at
1318. In other words, applying Holmes, the court decided that the plaintiffs theory of cau-
sation and injury made no sense. See id.
144. 202 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
[Vol. 39
RICO's causation requirement, 145 including the often-repeated (but
rarely controlling) statement that "a plaintiff lacks standing to assert,
as the basis for mail fraud, misrepresentations directed toward an-
other person or entity."1 46 Unquestioning acceptance of this proposi-
tion ignores the fact-sensitive inquiry that Holmes demands. True, one
can imagine a host of scenarios in which third-party misrepresenta-
tions were not the cause-in-fact of injuries, let alone the direct cause.
Prime One does not, however, present one of those scenarios.
To the contrary, Prime One arises from facts that most courts
would find sufficient to state the causation element of a fraud claim
under the common law, federal fraud statutes, and RICO. In Prime
One the defendants allegedly misrepresented to third parties that they
were authorized to collect lease and vehicle-sales proceeds. 147 The
plaintiffs claimed that this fraud allowed the defendants to convert
millions of dollars of lease proceeds belonging to the plaintiffs.1 48
Properly viewed, these allegations should be sufficient to demonstrate
RICO causation because (1) the plaintiffs were the target of the fraud
145. Some have argued that the Eleventh Circuit's requirement that each class mem-
ber demonstrate reliance amounts to a per se ban on fraud-based RICO class actions. See
Hanzman, supra note 31, at 37. That court, however, recently proved the fear unwarranted.
In Klay v. Humana, Inc., the court let stand the certification of a RICO-fraud class, even
though the case was of such massive scope that it "threatens to degenerate into a Hobbes-
ian war of all against all." 382 F.3d 1241, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004). Klay's holding was ulti-
mately based on its belief that other issues tended to predominate and that "circumstantial
evidence . .. can be used to show reliance is common to the whole class." Id. at 1259.
The factual crux in Klay was that the defendant HMOs systematically underpaid the
plaintiff physicians for their services through use of, for instance, rigged computer systems.
At the same time, however, "the defendants repeatedly claimed they would reimburse the
plaintiffs for medically necessary services . . . and sent the plaintiffs various . . . forms
claiming they had actually paid the plaintiffs the proper amounts." Id. From this the court
concluded that
[i]t does not strain credulity to conclude that each plaintiff, in entering into con-
tracts with the defendants, relied upon the defendants' representations and as-
sumed they would be paid the amounts they were due. A jury could quite
reasonably infer that guarantees concerning the physician pay-the very consid-
eration upon which those agreements are based-go to the heart of these agree-
ments, and that doctors based their assent upon them.
Id.
This is plainly an unusual scenario, and one may safely presume that it does not re-
present a sea of change in Eleventh Circuit class certification jurisprudence. It does never-
theless effectively demonstrate that that circuit is not as doctrinaire as some had supposed.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether the district court-which the circuit dubbed "a
veritable Leviathan"-can actually try the case. See id. at 1276.
146. Prime One, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 (quoting Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1110
(11th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis omitted).
147. Id. at 1348.
148. Id.
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(it was plaintiffs' money that defendants stole) and (2) the injury to
plaintiffs was a direct and contemporaneous result of the misrepresen-
tations (the money moved straight into defendants' pockets instead of
plaintiffs'). Under Holmes, no more should be required.
At the other end of the spectrum is the Seventh Circuit's recent
decision upholding class certification in Carnegie v. Household Interna-
tional, Inc.149 The underlying litigation arose out of tax refund antici-
pation loans.150 Some consumers do not want to wait for tax refunds;
predictably, enterprising lenders have moved in to fill the temporal
void between tax return filing and IRS refund.151 Although the lender
provides the money, a tax preparer arranges the loan.152 The plaintiffs
in Carnegie alleged that they were not told that the lender paid the tax
preparer a fee or that the tax preparer received an ownership interest
in the loan.15 3 The basic claim was that the defendants led plaintiffs to
believe that the tax preparer was their fiduciary when in fact the tax
preparer was self-dealing. 154
In 1999, the named plaintiff in one of numerous class-action suits
entered into a twenty-five million dollar global settlement, which the
district court approved. 155 The Seventh Circuit reversed because the
court was "concerned that the settlement might have been the prod-
uct of collusion between the defendants, eager to minimize their lia-
bility, and the class lawyers, eager to maximize their fees."156 On
remand, the district judge to whom the case was reassigned disap-
proved of the settlement, concluding that it was indeed unfair.157 That
judge subsequently certified a contested class, which gave rise to peti-
tions to appeal under Rule 23(f). 158 The Seventh Circuit granted the
petitions to consider questions involving, first, the procedures and cri-
teria for converting a settlement class to a litigation class and, second,
the bearing of judicial estoppel on class action litigation. 59 During
the course of its opinion, however, the court, in a thinly reasoned
149. 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004).
150. See id. at 658.
151. See id. at 658-59.
152. Id. at 659.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, No. 98 C 2178, 2000 WL 1051879, at *12
(N.D. Ill. July 28, 2000).
156. Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 659. The Seventh Circuit's reversal is found at Reynolds v.
Beneficial National Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002).
157. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 2d 680, 695 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
158. See Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 658.
159. See id.
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stretch of the opinion, made some rather astonishing and unfortunate
observations about the certifiability of fraud claims in which questions
of causation and reliance are in play.
After concluding that defendants were judicially estopped to con-
test certification grounds that they had urged vis-a-vis the earlier settle-
ment class, the court turned to the crowning distinction between
settlement and litigation classes-manageability. 160 Apparently, the
defendants argued nothing against manageability other than to refer
to millions of class members, which the court deemed "no argument
at all."161 Seemingly to convince itself that the putative class of seven-
teen million would be manageable, the court engaged in a bit of soph-
istry. First, the court noted that "there is a big difference from the
standpoint of manageability between the liability and remedy phases
of a class action. The number of class members need have no bearing
on the burdensomeness of litigating a violation of RICO. '162 So far, so
good. But the court essentially stopped there and built its conclusion
on an incomplete premise:
Whether particular members of the class were defrauded and if so
what their damages were are another matter, and it may be that if
and when the defendants are determined to have violated the law
separate proceedings of some character will be required to deter-
mine the entitlements of the individual class members to relief.
That prospect need not defeat class treatment of the question
whether the defendants violated RICO. Once that question is an-
swered, if it is answered in favor of the class, a global settlement
along the lines originally negotiated (though presumably with dif-
160. Id. at 660. The court states:
The defendants are correct, however, that a class might be suitable for settlement
but not for litigation. The class might be unmanageable if the case were actually
tried yet manageable as a settlement class because the settlement might eliminate
all the thorny issues that the court would have to resolve if the parties fought out
the case.
Id.
161. Id. at 661. The court further states:
The more claimants there are, the more likely a class action is to yield substantial
economies in litigation. It would hardly be an improvement to have in lieu of this
single class action seventeen million suits each seeking damages of $15 to $30.
The rejected settlement capped damages at these amounts for single and multi-
ple RALs respectively, and while the amounts may be too low they are indicative
of the modest stakes of the individual class members. The realistic alternative to a
class action is not seventeen million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as
only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30. But a class action has to be unwieldy
indeed before it can be pronounced an inferior alternative-no matter how mas-
sive the fraud or other wrongdoing that will go unpunished if class treatment is
denied-to no litigation at all.
Id.
162. Id.
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ferent dollar figures) will be a natural and appropriate sequel. And
if there is no settlement, that won't be the end of the world. Rule
23 allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to problems
created by the presence in a class action litigation of individual
damages issues. 163
What did the court miss here? Section 1964(c). Indeed, the court
leapt from the question of whether § 1962(c) was violated to the ques-
tion of damages,1 64 without considering how seventeen million indi-
viduals would prove that they had been injured "by reason of" that
violation.1 65 Given the alleged misrepresentations, statements de-
signed to make class members believe that their tax preparers were
fiduciaries, it seems unlikely that causation could be proven at trial
other than on an individual basis. At the end of the day, this case may
represent nothing more than a court's reluctance to let a group of
defendants who were willing to pay twenty-five million dollars walk
away without actually paying a dime. Unfortunately, though, if the
case is left uncorrected, it will no doubt create mischief for years to
come.
Civil RICO cases are often of enormous scope, especially when
they are pleaded as class actions against a large group of defendants.
Courts understandably look for general standards that will help them
circumscribe blockbuster cases. Marginal cases like Prime One and Car-
negie show, however, the folly of analytical shortcuts that ignore the
rigorous factual evaluation that Holmes requires in every RICO case.
163. Id. (citations omitted).
164. Although quantifying the amount of damages that a plaintiff suffered (after dem-
onstrating all other elements of its claim) need not prove an insurmountable obstacle to
certification, this is not so where the broader question of injury is at issue. See In re Merrill
Lynch Sec. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 391, 396, 398 (D.N.J. 1999) (class certification denied because
"proof' of-damages-as opposed to "calculation" of damages-required individualized de-
cision), affd, 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001).
165. See, e.g., Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1361 (l1th Cir. 2002). The court
stated that even if plaintiffs could show common RICO violations, they would "still have to
show, on an individual basis, that they relied on the misrepresentations." Id. (quoting An-
drews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis added);
Expanding Energy, Inc. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 180, 183 (S.D. Tex. 1990). The
court in Expanding Energy states:
It is beyond argument that Koch suffered shortages from time to time as well as
overages, and that some of the interest owners received consistent, honest mea-
surements [of their crude oil]. The impropriety of a class action in these circum-
stances seems to be obvious, since the class cannot show class-wide injury. Perhaps
some of the members of the proposed class can show injury for at least some of
their sales to Koch, but that fact argues against certifying a class at all.
132 F.R.D. at 183.
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Conclusion
Causation is the lynchpin of any civil RICO case. When a case
sounds in fraud, the question of how causation must be pled and
proven too often evolves into a pointless argument over whether reli-
ance bears on this question. As this Article demonstrates, there are
better ways to frame the causation analysis, at least in the most com-
mon types of cases. Reliance does not completely disappear, but its
relative importance is determined by the paradigm applicable to the
facts of the case at hand (for example, a consideration of direct versus
third-party representations), not a blanket pronouncement that it is
relevant to all RICO cases. This squares with the sort of fact-sensitive
analysis that the Holmes court envisioned and pays due attention to the
RICO statute's structure.
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